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  The paper contributes to the debate on cumulative advantage effects in academic research by 
examining  top  performance  in  research  and  its  persistence  over  time,  using  a  panel  dataset 
comprising the publications of biomedical and exact scientists at the KU Leuven in the period 
1992-2001.  We study the selection of researchers into productivity categories and analyze how 
they switch between these categories over time. About 25% achieves top performance at least 
once, while 5% is persistently top. Analyzing the hazard to first and subsequent top performance 
shows strong support for an accumulative process. Rank, gender, hierarchical position and past 
performance are highly significant explanatory factors.  
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1  Introduction 
     
What  makes  someone  a  top  researcher?  Why  do  (some)  top  performers 
manage to sustain their high productivity level while others peak in scientific output 
only sporadically or never? Why does a substantial part of academics hardly ever 
publish  anything?  Is  this  due  to  intrinsic  qualities  that  are  largely  fixed  before  a 
researcher writes her first paper?  Do exogenous factors, like gender, age, scientific 
discipline  or  organizational  structure  explain/contribute  to  differences  in  scientific 
performance  and  persistence  of  such  differences?    Or  does  the  research  system 
endogenously establish persistence of productivity differences by favoring the better 
researchers? 
 
Insights in the factors that drive differences in research performance and its 
dynamics  have  important  policy  implications.    Policy  makers  are  increasingly 
assessing  research  performance.    The  use  of  publication-  and  citation  counts  as 
instruments for evaluation of individual scientists within research institutes as well as 
for funding decisions for research labs and universities as a whole is becoming more 
widespread.   Furthermore, the allocation of research funding is increasingly being 
driven by criteria of scientific excellence, resulting in a concentration of more funds in 
fewer  hands.    Yet,  there  are  few  academic  studies  on  what  drives  research 
productivity.  A body of empirical research has recently emerged that attempts to pin 
down the determinants of scientific productivity, both at the level of the individual 
researcher and the more aggregate, institutional level.  However few studies have 
addressed the skewed distribution of research productivity, with its concentration in a 
limited number of top researchers and their persistency over time. 
     
This paper studies top research performance and its persistency over time, 
using a recent panel data set from the KU Leuven.  We first explore the selection of 
researchers  into  productivity  categories  (top,  medium,  low),  using  a  clustering 
analysis. To assess persistency, we construct mobility matrices; showing the moves 
to and from the “top performance” category.  Second, we analyze the determinants of 
top research performance and its dynamics in more detail.  We employ a duration 
model to study the factors that influence the hazard for a researcher to achieve a first 
and subsequent top performance level, taking into account time-varying covariates 
and  checking  for  the  influence  of  past  (top)  performance.      We  complement  the 
hazard analysis by a logit analysis of the characteristics determining (persistent) top 
performance.   
 
The data set is a panel comprising ten years of publication data 1992-2001, 
which allows the separation of age and cohort effects.   The data set allows to control 
for several factors that are expected to play a role in scientific publication activity, 
such as scientific discipline, gender, age, tenure, rank, hierarchical position (head of 
team) and seniority.   Furthermore, the record of each researcher contains teaching 
load and other administrative duties.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a 
brief literature survey. Section 3 provides information on the data and how it was 
assembled  from  different  sources.  In  section  4  we  establish  the  existence  of 
(persistent) productivity cohorts, while in section 5 we analyze the data in search of   3 
the characteristics determining the process towards (persistent) top performance.  In 
section 6 we conclude and touch upon directions for further research. 
 
2  Literature Survey 
 
Most  existing  studies  concentrate  on  the  effects  of  individual  determinants  of 
academic productivity.  The aspect of individual productivity that has received most 
attention  is  the  dynamics  of  research  productivity  over  the  life  cycle  of  the 
researcher.   The  earlier studies on US  data (e.g. Bernier et al. (1975) and Cole 
(1979)), find a curvilinear relationship between age and both quality and quantity of 
scientific  productivity.    A  limitation  of  these  earlier  studies  is  their  use  of  cross-
sectional data, which does not allow to disentangle age from experience and cohort 
effects  (Stephan  1996).    Levin  and  Stephan  (1991),  using  longitudinal  data  of 
American scientists, find that life cycles effects are present in five of the six areas of 
physics and earth sciences studied, with publishing activity initially increasing and 
then declining somewhere in mid-career.  
Gender  differences  in  scientific  productivity  are  another  line  of  attention  of 
researchers. Several studies have found that female scientists publish at lower rates 
than male scientists. Using a sample of American biochemists, Long (1993) finds that 
sex differences in the number of publications and citations are bigger during the first 
decade of the career but are reversed later. He attributes the lower productivity of 
females  to  their  overrepresentation  among  non-publishers  and  their  under 
representation among the extremely productive.  
In a more recent study of French condensed matter physicists, Mairesse and 
Turner  (2002)  analyze  the  impact  of  age,  gender  and  education  on  research 
productivity.  They confirm a quadratic relation between the age of the scientists and 
the number of publications. They also find significant positive effects for males and 
graduates from the French Grande Ecoles.  Their results also indicate a positive time 
trend, suggesting that there has been a wider and faster access to publication.  
In view of the significance of team effort in science, it is important to assess 
collective effects on individual productivity as also Stephan (1996) argues.  Early 
research  in  the  USA  found  researchers  at  prestigious  departments  to  be  more 
productive  and  cited  than  their  colleagues  in  lower-ranked  universities  (Cole  and 
Cole 1973). Also Turner and Mairesse (2002) provide evidence that the quality of 
other  researchers  belonging  to  the  laboratory  is  a  crucial  variable  for  explaining 
individual productivity.     
To  summarize,  existing  studies  assessing  individual  research  productivity 
have  indicated  the  importance  of  individual  characteristics  like  age,  cohort  and 
gender as well as collective characteristics of the laboratory or department to which 
the researcher belongs, whilst controlling for scientific discipline idiosyncrasies.    
 
Most  of  the  studies  to  date  aim  at  explaining  average  productivity  profiles, 
ignoring the often skewed distribution of research productivity, with many researchers 
non-active  and  a  few  researchers  accounting  for  the  bulk  of  the  publications.  
Furthermore, they analyze publications in a cross section or a short period of time, 
not allowing to properly account for time persistence of productivity patterns.   It is 
particularly  the  latter  phenomenon  we  focus  on  in  this  paper,  more  specifically 
persistency  of  top  research  productivity.    This  issue  of  persistence  of  research 
productivity profiles is underexplored in the literature.       4 
 
Why would we expect top research productivity to persist or not?   First, talent 
is important in determining research productivity.  Top research may require a “magic 
gland”  (Stephan  and  Levin  1992),  a  special  edge,  an  innate  ability.    Those  pre-
determined differences are unevenly spread in the population.  Those who have it, 
are always productive, those without, never see their careers take off and flourish.  
Hence, a differential distribution of talent within the scientific community will lead to 
research productivity differences which persist over time.  Of course, luck also enters 
the picture, especially when explaining the occurrence of “hits” following a scientific 
discovery.   Although luck enters in a variety of forms and is often accompanied by 
serendipity, it nevertheless predicts a more random and non-persistent top research 
productivity for the individual researcher.  
But next to talent and luck, effort is a particularly important factor explaining 
scientific output.  When researchers decide on the level of effort to impute, they trade 
costs and benefits.  Costs of effort will be lower for the more talented researchers, 
resulting  in  an  interaction  between  talent  and  effort  driving  (persistency  of)  top 
performance.    Furthermore,  in  line  with  research  on  firm  growth  (e.g.  Jovanovic  
(1982), Pakes and Ericson (1998)), one can argue that the effect of talent is not a 
fixed  effect  over  time,  particularly  when  interacted  with  effort  in  a  learning 
perspective.  Initially researchers may be uncertain about their talent when they enter 
the field, but gradually discover their capabilities from being active in the field (as in 
the passive learning models of e.g. Jovanovic (1982)), and/or from making efficiency 
enhancing  investment  (as  in  the  active  learning  models  of  e.g.  Pakes  and 
Ericson(1998)).  Both directions predict that younger and “smaller” researchers will 
have a higher potential for learning and hence variance in performance over time, 
while older researchers will have a higher persistence in performance as they are 
more confident about their talents.  Once a researcher learns she is good at it, she 
will be more motivated to put effort into the process.   
Several benefits may motivate scientists to exert effort, as argued by Stephan 
& Levin (1992), Dasgupta & David (1994):  monetary rewards, recognition and the 
“puzzle”  joy.    These  motivational  forces  may  explain  persistency  in  research 
productivity through a process of accumulative advantage where motivation to exert 
effort depends on past performance.  The Matthew effect described by Merton (1968) 
states  that  the  recognition  and  monetary  value  awarded  to  a  scientist’s 
accomplishments  depends  on  his  status  in  the  scientific  community.    Highly 
productive researchers maintain or increase their productivity because they receive 
recognition  and  resources,  while  those  scientists  who  do  not,  become  less 
productive.  Successful scientists get their work more easily published, get easier 
citations, research funding, quicker tenure and promotion, higher wages, jobs in more 
prestigious  institutions,  better  infrastructure,  better  and  more  PhD  and  post-doc 
students…  In summary,  being more recognized  and  having access to more  and 
better  resources,  more  productive  researchers  will  devote  more  effort  to  scientific 
output, leading to persistency in research performance.  They may even escape the 
typically observed non-linear age profile, being less likely to relocate efforts at mid-
life.  Zuckerman & Merton (1971) argue that this tenacity occurs not only because the 
successful have accumulated advantage and have become addicted to recognition, 
but also because they see this as a process to validate the judgments of the scientific 
community that their capacities have been correctly assessed.     
There is a lot of anecdotal empirical evidence on accumulative advantage (see 
e.g. Stephan  & Levin  (1992)), but little recent systematic empirical analysis.   An   5 
empirical  analysis  on  productivity  dynamics  is  presented  by  Allison  and  Stewart 
(1974).  They use a cross-section of chemists, physicists, and mathematicians in the 
US, and find that the highly skewed distributions of productivity among researchers 
can be explained by a process of accumulative advantages. This inequality becomes 
increasingly unequal as career age increases. In an extension of this study, Allison et 
al.  (1982)  examine  cohorts  of  biochemists  and  chemists,  and  they  confirm  that 
increasing  inequality  is  observed  for  counts  of  publications  but  not  for  counts  of 
citations to all previous publications. 
 
3  The Data 
 
The data set we use to assess persistency of high research productivity is a unique 
panel of 1040 scientists within the fields of biomedical and exact sciences, in the 
period 1992-2001, employed at the KU Leuven, the largest and oldest university in 
Belgium
1.    KU  Leuven  has  the  ambition  to  establish  a  top  position  in  poles  of 
excellence,  and  have  a  good  performance  in  the  other  areas
2.    To  this  end  it 
allocates research funding to research proposals on the basis of (international) peer 
review of excellence in research.  Also, recruitment and promotion criteria carry a 
strong  research  quality  requirement.    In  addition,  research  output  (quantity  and 
quality) of all its academic staff is regularly monitored.   
 
Most researchers in the sample were not employed for the full 10 years: some of 
them retired or left the university before 2001, others joined after 1992. These entries 
and exits yield an unbalanced panel and allow examining cohort effects.  The data 
set holds on average 781 researchers per year in an unbalanced panel
 3.  
 
We pooled different sources of data sets, combining information from the personnel 
administration  of  the  KU  Leuven  with  bibliometric  data.  The  dataset  contains  the 
following information: 
 
                                                 
1  Founded  in  1425,  the  KU  Leuven  is  the  oldest  and  largest  university  in  Flanders  and  Belgium, 
encompassing all academic disciplines. About 1.400 tenured professors and more than 3.500 researchers are 
currently employed at KU Leuven, dealing with a student population of more than 30000 students each year.  It 
has the legal status of a private institution, but receives most of its funding from the Belgian Government, both 
in a direct and in an indirect, competitive way.   The basic public funding of the university, that pays for the 
salaries of the academic personnel, has remained more of less stable in the last decade, which has resulted in a 
more or less stable total number of professors at KU Leuven.  The funding for research on the other hand has 
increased continuously.  Most of this funding is obtained on a competitive basis:  about one quarter is private 
funding from industry, about half comes from project funding from regional/national and EU governments and 
about one quarter is from the regional government allocated to the KU Leuven based on its share of regional 
publications, citations and PhDs.  Of this research funding, only a very small part (<5%) is spent on financing 
academic positions (most is spent on pre- en post docs, infrastructure and expenses).   
2 The KU Leuven has as mission statement in the observed period, to be among the top 25 European 
research universities in a wide number of scientific disciplines.  But it aims to be among the top particularly in 
those disciplines in which it is already strong:  biochemistry, biosciences, biomedical and several disciplines in 
medicine, among which hematology, oncology and cardiology.  
3 Given our focus on persistence, we restricted the dataset to researchers whom we observe for at least 2 
periods. For 97 researchers there was only one observation in the dataset; these were dropped.   6 
o  Scientific  output  (per  researcher  per  year
4)  i.e.  publications  in  ISI  journals 
classified by scientific discipline
5,6;   
o  Individual and career-related variables (per researcher per year) i.e. gender,   
age,  cohort (year of entry at KU Leuven),  years of tenure,  rank (assistant 
professor, associate professor, professor and full professor),  seniority in rank,  
full-time versus part time position;  
o  Organizational  membership  at  group-  (exact  versus  biomedical  sciences),   
faculty- (e.g. medicine) and department (e.g. microbiology and immunology)
7 
level; 
o  Other information relevant for examining scientific performance, viz. teaching 
load (actual load in year-hours), other administrative duties within KU Leuven,  
head of a research unit. 
     
 Table 1 and table 2 present the distribution of scientists over the respective 
faculties and disciplines within the Biomedical and Exact Science groups of the KU 
Leuven. Both groups, each comprising three faculties, are comparable in size. Within 
the group of Exact Sciences, the faculty of Science (195 professors) and the one of 
Engineering (214) are the largest. In the group of Biomedical Sciences, the faculty of 
Medicine (462 professors) clearly dominates in terms of size. The vast majority of all 
researchers  in  the  panel  (93%)  are  professors  and  hence  combine  research  and 
teaching activities.    Most of them have tenure (75%).  Considering  both scientific 
discipline and organizational membership, allows disentangling faculty & department 
organizational and management effects from scientific discipline specific influences. 
     
The first column in table 2 shows the final distribution of the researchers in the 
sample  over  the  disciplines.  Table  5  reports  year  averages  for  the  individual  and 
career-related characteristics of the researchers in the whole sample. About 88% of 
them are male with an average age of 47.8 years. About one third of the researchers 
are born after 1956.  38% of the researchers entered as a professor after 1992. With 
respect to tenure, 76% of the researchers in the sample have tenure in every year 
that we observe them, 15% never has tenure and 9% switches from a temporary 
contract to a fixed appointment.  We distinguish between four main ranks, with rank 1 
the  entry  level  (‘assistant  professor’
8)  and  rank  4  the  highest  possible  rank  (‘full 
                                                 
4 "Year" always refers to a "database year" i.e. the year in which the publication was taken up in the ISI 
records. 
5 A key characteristic of the dataset is that it allows controlling for scientific discipline-specific effects: the KU 
Leuven-Steunpunt O&O Statistics classified every journal covered by the SCI into one or more twelve high-level 
disciplines, all within the field of exact or biomedical sciences. This allowed us to assign each scientist the 
disciplines in which she published a paper in that year. About 23% of all researchers could not be assigned to a 
main discipline because they did not publish in the period 1992-2001. For all others, we determined a 'main 
discipline' for each researcher, which is defined as the discipline, taken from the twelve high-level disciplines, in 
which the researcher has the most publications in the period 1992-2001. For 54 researchers there was a tie i.e. 
they published an equal amount of papers in at least two disciplines. For them we randomly assigned a main 
discipline from the tie disciplines. 
6 There is also scientific output that does not fall under the scope of the Science Citation Index of the 
ISI For instance, the ISI database does not include proceedings, which in some disciplines, like engineering, are 
an important publication outlet. 
7  While officially the “faculty” as organizational unit is mostly responsible for the teaching programs, 
and the “department” is the organizational unit for research activities, in practice both levels are intertwined, 
particularly  with  respect  to  recruiting  and  promotion  of  researchers.    The  “Faculty”  level  has  a  higher 
hierarchical  position,  with  the  “dean”  being  a  member  of  the  “bureau”  that  decides  on  recruitment  and 
promotion, on the basis of “advice” from the departments.   
8 In the remainder of the paper, we refer to ranks by their number.   7 
professor’)
9. One quarter of researchers has the most junior rank, whilst about the 
same  quantity  has  reached  the  top  of  the  career  ladder.  More  than  80%  of  the 
scientists have a full-time position at the university either in one single contract or in a 
combination of several positions. The average teaching load for a professor amounts 
to 4.18 year-hours
10 and increases monotonously with rank. 
As  shown  in  the  first  column  of  table  4,  on  average  a  researcher  publishes  2.97 
articles  per  year
11.    But  this  average  has  a  high  standard  deviation  (4.42).    The 
propensity  to  publish  varies  greatly  among  disciplines:  the  average  number  of 
publications per year ranges from 1.72 for mathematics to 6.34 for biosciences
12 (see 
table 6). All this reflects the importance of scientific discipline specific effects when 
examining research productivity.  In terms of output quality as measured by citations 
in a 3-year window, the KU Leuven researchers score above the world average in 
each of the disciplines (except neurosciences & physics).  Finally, publication activity 
has increased over time in all disciplines as shown in figure 1. 
 
 
4  Descriptive Analysis 
4.1  Performance Profiles:  Identifying Top Performance 
 
In  order  to  identify  top  performance  we  carried  out  a  clustering  of  the 
researchers' yearly publication records.  We focus our output analysis on the number 
of publications only, see infra.  In particular, we compared each scientist's number of 
publications in a given year and discipline with the score of his or her colleagues in 
the  same  discipline.  This  allows  to  correct  for  the  supra  documented  discipline 
specific publication patterns as well as time trends.  Every researcher is judged not 
only by his or her main discipline but, given the degree of multidisciplinarity, for each 
of the twelve disciplines.  
 
We implemented the following procedure to assign every researcher to one of 
the  'productivity  categories’  (top,  medium,  low).  For  each  year,  the  scientist's 
performance within each of the twelve disciplines is compared with colleagues who 
are active in that discipline, using k-means clustering. A researcher is thus classified 
into  top,  medium  or  low,  for  each  discipline  reflecting  the  productivity  of  the 
researcher in the discipline in that year
13.  
                                                 
9 KU Leuven, like most Belgian universities, offers tenure to assistant professors who successfully pass 
the judgment of their work in the years following their hiring.  After this initial tenure decision, for which young 
professors are primarily evaluated on their research output as opposed to other activities, they can be promoted 
through full professor based on their research and teaching performance, as well as duties performed within the 
university, with the latter typically gaining importance as one progresses through the ranks.  Hence, rank 1 is 
non-tenure; rank 2-4 is tenure.    
10 A year-hour gives the average weekly teaching load in an academic year. One year-hour corresponds 
to 30 teaching hours. 
11  A  publication  gets  on  average  4.63  citations  and  has  an  impact  measure  of  3.04.  A  scientist 
collaborates on a paper on average with 4.68 co-authors. 
12  This high degree of heterogeneity across scientific disciplines also holds for other output measures 
such as citations, impact factors and co-authorship.    
13 In total 12x3x10 clusters are created (12 disciplines, 10  years). Comparing the mean number of 
publications for the clusters within a discipline using a ranksum test, in 12 cases the null hypothesis of identical 
means cannot be rejected.   8 
 
Subsequently, we aggregate across disciplines. The researcher is considered 
as top in a particular year if she belongs to the 'top cluster' in at least one of the 
twelve disciplines
14. If the scientist is not in the top cluster for any of the disciplines, 
but  in  the  'medium  cluster'  for  one  or  more  disciplines,  then  she  is  considered 
medium. She is classified as having a low output if she scores low for each discipline. 
Because the publication process not necessarily adheres to a year-by-year logic, the 
yearly performance measures are used to construct a performance indicator based 
on  a  two-year  moving  window
15.  This  avoids  that  we  label  very  productive 
researchers who happen to face a year with many projects in the pipeline but with 
relatively  few  actual  publications  as  non-persistent  in  top-level  output.  The 
mechanism for judging researchers’ output is illustrated in figure 2. On average 14% 
of observations are classified as a top performance whereas 28% vs 58% end up in 
the  medium  respectively  the  low  productivity  categories.  This  top  14%  of 
observations accounts for 42.08% of all publications in the sample, while the 58% 
observations  representing  low  performance  jointly  supply  7.76%  of  all  output, 
confirming the skewedness in distribution of publications. 
 
4.2  Establishing persistence: Once Top, Always Top? 
 
In order to establish whether persistence effects exist, we look at the mobility 
of researchers between the productivity clusters. Scientists who ‘get trapped’ in the 
low  research  productivity  category  may  spend  their  time  on  other  things  such  as 
teaching or internal management duties, may not have the intrinsic ability for doing 
research, or may face a system geared at stimulating the past performers. The latter 
interpretation  attributes  persistent  low  scientific  output  to  a  cumulative  advantage 
mechanism  that  disadvantages  researchers  with  a  low  initial  output.      The  same 
cumulative advantage will generate persistency at the top. 
 
To capture researchers’ mobility across productivity clusters, we constructed a 
series of transition matrices. Table 3 shows the mobility matrix for the transition of 
1992/1993 to 1993/1994, relating the three productivity clusters (low/medium/top) of 
1992/1993  to  those  of  the  subsequent  2-year  interval.  65.9%  of  researchers  in 
1993/1994 belong to the low productivity category. If previous output was irrelevant 
for  explaining  current  performance,  we  would  see  the  same  distribution  of 
researchers within a subgroup as in the whole sample. Taking the 410 scientists who 
performed low in 1992/1993, we would expect 270 scientists (65.9%) to display a low 
output again in 1993/1994. The number of researchers (379) who end up in the low 
productivity group in 1993/1994 is clearly higher, indicating that past low performance 
serves as a predictor for future low performance. The same effect occurs at the other 
end  of  the  productivity  spectrum:  73.0%  of  the  high  performers  (89  scientists)  in 
1992/1993  repeat  their  high  output  in  the  next  year,  a  higher  than  expected 
percentage. And also within the middle performance category, there is a higher than 
expected probability that researchers remain in this category over the years.  The 
‘low’ category is the most immobile category with a lower than expected probability to 
                                                 
14 So a researcher has in principle twelve opportunities to get into the top cluster for a particular year. 
15 This entails the loss of one observation per researcher.  The reported results are not sensitive to a 
yearly versus two-year moving window.   9 
switch  to  the  middle  and  a  fortiori  the  high  category.    The  Pearson  Chi²-statistic 
(613.65)  confirms  that  performance  levels  across  these  two  years  are  not 
independent.  Similar results are obtained for transition matrices covering the other 
two-year intervals.  We may conclude that researchers tend to be rather immobile in 
their scientific output, especially the low performers.     All this evidence goes against 
a ‘luck’ theory for explaining top performance, favoring more the intrinsic qualities, 
the gradual accumulation and Matthew effect in explaining top performance. 
 
To  further  analyze  this  persistence  of  performance,  we  measure  the 
persistence of each researcher by counting the number of years in a cluster relative 
to the years of her employment.  In particular, we classify a researcher as persistent 
top if she belongs to the top performance category in every two-year window during 
the  period  in  which  she  was  employed  by  the  university.  Analogously,  the  ‘non-
persistent top’-group contains those who belong to the top category at least once but 
not in every two-year window of their employment. The scientists that do publish but 
never make it to the top group are labeled ‘average’ whilst the remaining researchers 
are  ‘inactive’.  This  yields  an  exhaustive  classification  of  researchers  into  4 
‘persistence categories’, as shown in table 4.    
Only  49  researchers  (5%  of  the  sample
16)  are  part  of  the  top  productivity 
category for every two-year window of their employment in 1992-2001. These are the 
persistent top researchers.  These 5% persistent top researchers account for 20.37% 
of  total  publications  in  the  sample,  confirming  again  the  very  skew  nature  of  the 
productivity distribution.  About 20% of the sample belongs to the top category at 
least once but not persistently. Slightly more than half of all researchers (52%) may 
be classified as ‘average’ whilst about 24% of the sample has a blank publication 
record throughout the observed periods.  
Pairwise comparisons using the Wilcoxon ranksum test show that the average 
number of publications differs significantly for the persistence categories, indicating 
that we can meaningfully distinguish between them.  But the different categories do 
not only differ significantly in terms of number of publications, but also with respect to 
the quality of publications.  Although we focus our output dimension for identifying top 
performers on quantity of publications only, we find, in line with other studies, that 
quantity and quality of publications are correlated.  All research output measures for 
quality  (citations,  impact  measures)  decline  monotonously  when  moving  from  the 
persistent top researchers to the inactive cohort.  Nevertheless, the decline is less 
outspoken  with  respect  to  quality  measures  than  with  respect  to  number  of 
publications.  
 
Splitting  the  individual  and  career-related  variables  by  persistency  category 
(see table 5), yields some initial hints with respect to different researcher profiles per 
persistency category. For example, we see that the representation of the two sexes 
in  the  productivity  categories  is  fairly  even,  although  women  are  slightly  more 
represented in the persistent non-active and in the average category, as in Turner & 
Mairesse (2003).  Women are underrepresented in the top performance category, 
especially in the non-persistent top performers.  
Furthermore, we find little or no support for a curvilinear relationship between 
age  and  output  on  average.  We  do  not  find  the  older  age  cohorts  to  be 
underrepresented  among  the  most  productive  researchers.  This  confirms  that  the 
                                                 
16  If  we  had  used  a  one-year  window  to  assess  persistence,  we  would  have  ended  with  only  10 
individuals, or 1% of the sample, in the persistent top category.   10 
most productive researchers can beat the curvilinear age profile.  This is not the case 
for  the  unproductive  researchers  who  are  overrepresented  in  the  age  categories 
above 50 and especially above 60, pointing at segregation on the basis of age at the 
bottom of the productivity distribution. 
Related to the age results are the ones with respect to rank.  There is strong 
overrepresentation of full professors among the persistent top, while the inactive and 
average  researchers  are  underrepresented  in  the  full  professor  rank,  but 
overrepresented in the lowest rank. In addition, as shown by average rank seniority, 
top  researchers  tend  to  spend  less  time  through  the  three  ranks  preceding  full 
professor than average and inactive researchers, while inactive researchers tend to 
stay longer in the less-than-full-professor rank.  All this suggests that the promotion 
procedures in place at the KU Leuven tend to select the more prolific faculty. 
Also,  inactive  and  average  productive  scientists  are  more  likely  to  have 
entered  professorship  recently  i.e.  after  1992.  Recent  hires  might  suffer  a 
disadvantage since they are less likely to have made it already to the top cluster 
given their shorter employment history in a cumulative process.   
The table reveals that it is important to correct for the type of contract: only half 
of the researchers who don’t publish have a full-time position at the university.  
As far as research-teaching trade-off is concerned, persistent top researchers 
tend to have a similar teaching load than the average researchers.  Striking is the low 
teaching load for inactive scientists, but this can at least partially be explained by the 
higher share of part timers in this category (50% versus 20%) given that they typically 
have a lower teaching load than people in a fulltime position (1.6 versus 4.8 year-
hours).   When splitting teaching load by rank, persistent top researchers in all but 
the second rank do teach less than their colleagues from other productivity cohorts 
who tend to stick closer to the average teaching load.   The most marked difference 
occurs in rank 4 where persistent top researchers have a substantially lower teaching 
load, particularly as compared to the average.  Also note that junior ranked faculty 
have  a  lower  teaching  load,  which  should  allow  them  to  concentrate  more  on 
research activities in the early stage of their career.  
 
 
5  Multivariate  Analysis  of  Persistence  in  Top 
Research Performance 
  
In this section, we take a multivariate look at the process to top performance 
and its persistence.   We use various approaches.   In section 5.1 we use a duration 
analysis to study the determinants of high research productivity and its persistency.  
Section  5.2  uses  a  logistic  model  to  explain  long-term  persistence  in  research 
productivity. 
 
5.1.  The ‘risk’ to be top 
 
In  this  section,  we  use  a  duration  model  approach  to  determine  which 
independent variables are significantly correlated with the survival time in the non-top 
research  productivity  category.    This  allows  discussing  which  characteristics   11 
influence the probability of becoming a top researcher at some point in time.  We use 
the  most  general  proportional  hazards  model  because  it  is  not  based  on  any 
assumption concerning the shape of the underlying survival distribution as opposed 
to  the  range  of  parametric  survival  models  (exponential,  Weibull,  loglogistic, 
lognormal…).  
 
5.1.1  The Cox proportional hazards model 
 
We use the Cox proportional hazards model (1972) where the event of interest 
is top research performance in a given time period
17. The model specifies the hazard 
to be top for the j-th individual as the product of a baseline hazard  0( ) h t , i.e. the 
hazard when all covariates are equal to zero, and the exponential function of the 
parameters  x β  and regressors  j x : 
( ) 0 ( | ) ( )exp j j x h t x h t x β =  
 
The  baseline  hazard  is  left  unspecified,  meaning  that  the  model  makes  no 
assumptions about the shape of the hazard over time. We opt for this approach since 
theory does not provide us with a reasonable assumption about the shape of the 
hazard. The cost of this semi-parametric approach is a loss in efficiency. 
Whatever the shape of the hazard function, it is assumed to be the same for 
everyone. This means that the hazard functions of any two individuals who differ in 
their characteristics are multiplicative replicas from each other. 
We use two types of hazard models.  The first one analyses the hazard to first 
top performance.  In this case, once a top performance is reached, the researcher is 
removed  out  of  the  sample.    Hence,  for  this  analysis,  the  sample  consists  of  all 
researchers  before  their  first  top  performance.    This  allows  concentrating  on  the 
process  towards  first  top  performance,  but  ignores  subsequent  observations  on 
performance.   Nevertheless, given the skewed distribution of top performance, the 
overwhelming majority of observations are maintained in this analysis.   
Using all information in the data, we also estimate a repeated events model, 
where  we  model  not  only  the  hazard  to  first  top  performance,  but  to  all  top 
performances.  We impose a sequential ordering of events: a researcher can only be 
‘at risk’ for her k-th top performance if she achieved k-1 top performances in the past. 
A  key  element  in  our  approach  is  that  we  allow  the  risk  process  underlying  top 
performance to change with the occurrence of previous top performances. The main 
model estimates a common baseline hazard across event ranks as in the Andersen-
Gill  counting  process
18  model  (1982)  but  with  the  inclusion  of  a  previous  events 
counter which allows the hazard to differ proportionally between top performances. 
As a robustness check we also estimate the model with a restricted or ‘stratified’ risk 
set i.e. with different baseline hazards per top performance, commonly known as the 
Prentice-Williams-Peterson model (1981).
 19  
                                                 
17 More specifically, we use the two-year intervals discussed in section 4.1. 
18 The counting process definition of the duration variable uses the time of the (k-1)th top performance 
as  the  starting time for  each  risk  interval.  This  set-up is  preferable  when  the  substantive  interest  is  in  the 
evolution of the risk to be top as a function of time since the onset of risk.  
19  This latter model may be estimated using either a counting process or gap time formulation of time, 
allowing us to check which view of the risk process fits the data best.  The gap time approach ‘resets the clock’   12 
Given that we work with multiple failure-time data, the failure times pertaining 
to a single researcher will be correlated, violating the independence of failure times 
assumption required in traditional survival analysis. This problem is avoided in the 
first top performance  analysis, but taking into account repeated events introduces 
dependence between failure times pertaining to a single researcher. We account for 
this by adjusting the covariance matrix of the estimators. In general however, this 
approach does not fully address the problem since an individual’s top performances 
may  be  correlated  due  to  a  characteristic  not  being  measured,  such  as  ability, 
instead of being brought about by an accumulative advantage process. Therefore, as 
an additional robustness check we estimate a model where a latent random effect, or 
‘frailty’,  enters  multiplicatively  on  the  hazard  function:  ) exp( ) ( ) ( 0 β α ij i ij x t h t h = .  The 
frailties αi are unobservable and are assumed to follow a gamma distribution with 
mean  one  and  variance  to  be  estimated  from  the  data.  If  the  variance  differs 
significantly  from  zero,  then  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  unobserved  heterogeneity 
cannot be maintained. 
 
5.1.2  Censoring and truncation 
 
We define the starting time for the duration variable as the moment when the 
individual enters as assistant professor at KU Leuven. This marks a natural starting 
point for the onset of risk and it excludes earlier periods of time when the hazard is 
zero.     
Our  observation  window  ranges  from  1992  to  2001.  This  implies  that  the 
majority of researchers in the sample (62%) are ‘at risk’ prior to 1992 and that their 
performance data are left censored to the extent that we do not know whether or how 
many times these scientists achieved top performance i.e. the censoring value is not 
known. Analogously, 86% of researchers is last observed at censoring time 2001 but 
continues to be at risk and we are ignorant of their performance beyond this point.  
While this right censoring is not likely to affect our results, the left censoring is a more 
important issue.   
We will consider all individuals who became a member of the faculty prior to 
1992 as cases  of ‘late entry’  in the risk set i.e.  we  treat these individuals  as not 
observationally at risk of being top, ignoring top performance before 1992. We use 
the  same  approach  for  the  right-censored  observations,  thereby  making  the 
assumption that durations are independent of observed entry and exit times. Stated 
differently, we assume that the censoring is non-informative (Cox and Oakes 1994).  
We nevertheless include an entry cohort dummy for those individuals having entered 
before 1992.  We will also perform the analysis on the sample excluding the faculty 
which have entered before 1992.  
Finally, the dataset contains observations that are terminated before censoring 
time. It concerns individuals who left the university or who retired before 2001 (14% 
of researchers). The precise reason of termination may be important for the same 
non-informative  censoring  requirement  as  above,  a  condition  which  is  violated  if 
termination  is  in  some  way  related  to  survival  time.  This  could  be  the  case  if 
                                                                                                                                                      
to zero after each top performance. This definition  of time is  preferable when the risk  process  varies as a 
function of time since the occurrence of the previous top performance.   13 
individuals tend to self-select out of the university once they gain experience about 
their capacity to deliver as a researcher
20. 
 
5.1.3  Variables 
 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  hazard  to  enter  the  category  of  top 
performance,  either  as  a  first  or  repeated  event.    The  categorization  of  top 
performance, as defined in section 4.1, is time and discipline specific.  This takes 
care  of  discipline  and  time  specific  effects  that  may  drive  the  definition  of  what 
constitutes a top performance in terms of number of publications required for such 
top performance.  
Which independent variables do we consider to influence this hazard to top 
performance?    The  existing  studies  assessing  individual  research  productivity 
reviewed in section 2, have indicated the importance of individual characteristics like 
age,  cohort  and  gender.    Also  collective  characteristics  of  the  laboratory  or 
department to which the researcher belongs have been indicated as important.  In 
line  with  the  existing  literature  we  include  the  same  characteristics,  not  to  check 
whether they influence research productivity in general, but whether they play a role 
in explaining the hazard to (first and repeated) top research performance. 
Following earlier studies, we include gender to check whether females are less 
likely  to  deliver  (repeated)  top  performance.        Second,  we  include  age  and  age 
squared, with the squared term to check for non-linear age effects, as in previous 
analysis on research productivity.  We expect age to be beneficial for generating top 
performance,  given  that  it  takes  time  and  experience  to  build  an  advantage.  
Furthermore, if there is accumulative advantage, we expect no concavity for age in 
the repeated top performance analysis, with top performers being able to beat the 
age decline.  To disentangle age from cohort effects, we also include dummies for 
entry  into  the  sample.    The  most  important  cohort  effect  seems  to  be  a  marked 
increase in hiring by the KU Leuven in 1992
21.   There were no other cohort shocks 
that could be identified
22.  The dummy for entry after 1992 also allows at the same 
time to correct for left censoring.   
All existing studies indicate the importance of controlling for scientific discipline 
idiosyncrasies.   Although our top performance classification is already discipline and 
time specific, we nevertheless include scientific discipline dummies to check whether 
discipline-specific aspects drive the process towards top performance.   
 
Beyond  the  traditionally  considered  variables  like  age,  gender,  cohort  and 
scientific  discipline,  the  KU  Leuven  personnel  data  set  also  allows  to  include  a 
number of other determining variables.  A first set of variables reflects the influence 
of the  personnel  strategy of  the university to  reward and  provide incentives  to its 
                                                 
20 In support of the argument that the data displays non-informative random censoring, we see that the 
majority of terminations happens at relatively advanced age (more than 60% of leaving scientists is older than 
sixty, on a pre-retirement scheme). Furthermore, for the terminations before retirement time it is likely that these 
people leave because they, for example, got a good outside offer and not because they consider themselves 
inadequate researchers: there are no significant differences in research performance between the researchers 
leaving the university before the age of 50 and those of comparable age, rank and discipline, staying.   Moreover, 
the university has not yet a history of firing people for low research performance. 
21 This peak in hiring corresponds mainly to a growing number of retiring faculty that needed to be 
replaced. 
22  When including a full set of cohort dummies, no significant effects could be detected.   14 
researchers:  tenure, rank, and seniority in rank.  With respect to tenure, we would 
expect,  all  else  equal,  that  those  researchers  up  for  tenure,  will  have  a  higher 
motivation to provide inputs into the research process.  Once tenure is acquired there 
is less motivation for delivering star performance.  The same holds for rank: in lower 
ranks, researchers should have more incentives to put in effort to get promotion.  On 
the other hand, the higher ranks also have more incentives to put in effort to “prove 
their rank”.   Since past research performance is taken into account when hiring and 
promoting, it is likely that top performance will increase the probability of getting a 
higher rank.  To take this endogeneity (at least partly) into account, we include the 
rank variables  with one period  lagged relative to top performance.    The variable 
seniority in rank should capture increasing pressure to provide effort, the longer a 
researcher is in his current rank (since the more likely she is to be up for promotion).  
But  again  we  might  expect  a  non-linearity,  once  a  researcher  is  far  beyond  the 
expected  seniority  (typically  two  years),  this  might  reflect  a  structurally  reduced 
probability to get promotion.  Also the more seniority, the higher is the wage and thus 
the smaller is the marginal benefit from increasing wage with rank.  Especially in the 
end rank (full professor) seniority in rank looses its specific function and will correlate 
with age.   
Beyond  the  seniority  in  rank,  we  also  include  seniority  as  professor.    This 
variable might be important beyond the seniority in rank, since wages received by 
professors in Belgium is beyond rank also, and strongly, determined by seniority as 
professor.   
We also include the organizational unit to which the researcher belongs at the 
KU  Leuven.    This  allows  capturing  the  influence  of  organizational  structure  and 
strategy to promote and provide incentives for research, to the extent that these units 
are  responsible  for  developing  a  good  research  environment.    It  also  allows 
correcting for  the  impact of spillovers from  the quality or prestige of the group to 
which the researcher belongs.  We include “faculty” dummies, since this is the most 
decisive  organization  level  at  KU  Leuven  in  terms  of  recruitment  and  promotion 
decisions.  But we also perform analyses with “department” dummies. 
Also  important  is  to  correct  for  fulltime  or  part  time  appointment  at  the 
universities,  since  part  time  appointments,  in  our  sample  mostly  occurring  at  the 
engineering  faculty,  are  typically  for  people  from  industry  who  are  hired  and 
evaluated  on  teaching  rather  than  research.    We  include  a  dummy  for  fulltime 
position, but will also report the results for fulltime researchers only.  
The inclusion  of actual teaching load should be able to correct  for the lost 
opportunity time for research when having to teach students.  Hence, we expect a 
negative effect on the hazard for top performance.  
Finally, we also have information on whether a researcher heads a research 
unit.    A  head  of  a  unit  has  access  to  resources  for  research  (infrastructure  and 
researchers), which allows him to be more associated with research output in the 
form of publications in his own name or from his team, as last author.  Given that top 
performers are more likely to become heads of unit, there is an issue of endogeneity.  
We lag this variable by one period.   
 
 
5.1.4  Results 
 
a)  Hazard to first top performance   15 
 
We  start  with  discussing  the  results  from  the  Cox  model  on  first  top 
performance only.  The estimates in Table 7 are presented in terms of their effect on 
the odds to be a top performer. A coefficient smaller (larger) than one, reflects a 
negative (positive) effect.  
 
Being male increases the odds of displaying first top performance significantly 
and considerably, by a factor of 2.5.  Rank is highly significant and the size of the 
coefficients suggests that lower ranks have a significantly lower hazard for first top 
performance as compared to rank 4 (full professor).  This may be picking  up the 
accumulative  advantage  effect  that  higher  ranked  professors  get  more  resources, 
have  more  incentives  to  put  in  effort,  and  more  experience,  increasing  their 
probability of realizing a top performance. On top op the rank effect, being a head of 
unit also considerably and significantly increases the hazard to first top performance.  
With heads  of unit  having  available the research resources in their  unit, they  are 
more likely to be prolific, again supporting the accumulative advantage effect.  Once 
corrected for rank, age has a small and non-significant effect on the hazard and there 
is  no  sign  of  non-linearity  in  the  age  effect.    Also  seniority  and  tenure  have  no 
significant  effect
23.    Teaching  load  is  significant  and  negative,  suggesting  a 
substitutive  effect  between  research  and  teaching,  although  the  magnitude  of  the 
effect is small. 
The correction for entry cohort after 1992 shows a significantly higher hazard 
to first top for late entrants, suggesting that the researchers hired before 1992 are not 
at higher risk for top performance, on the contrary. Also the control variable of having 
a fulltime position at the university is significant and with a high, positive impact: part 
timers  are  indeed  less  likely  to  be  prolific  in  research.    Both  results  suggest  the 
importance of correction for entry and fulltime position
24.  Even if we correct for the 
main  discipline  of  the  researcher  in  the  model
25,  the  membership  of  the  different 
faculties
26  matters  for  agriculture,  medicine  and  pharmacy.  Looking  at  the  more 
detailed department membership (estimates not reported) reveals that organizational 
differences also continue to play a role within faculties. 
 
When we split the analysis by group (biomedical, engineering and sciences) 
the importance of rank  holds  across groups (results not shown). The  engineering 
faculty shows a positive but slightly concave age effect at the 10% significance level 
while it remains absent for the other groups.  The gender and fulltime effect is driven 
by the biomedical observations as well as the impact of heading a research unit, 
while  the  negative  teaching  effect  occurs  mainly  in  the  engineering  and  science 
faculties.   
 
To further examine whether the process to first top performance is a gradual 
process requiring a steady build up of publications or rather a discontinuous burst in 
                                                 
23    Dropping  tenure  and  seniority  in  the  analysis  does  not  improve  the  significance  of  the  age 
coefficients.  
24  The second specification in table 7 reports the results for the sample concentrating on fulltimers only. 
Most  results  remain,  except  for  the  substitute  effect  for  teaching  which  looses  significance.    Also  for  the 
subsample  with  entrants  after  1992,  the  direction  and  magnitude  of  most  effects  are  maintained,  but  the 
significance for many parameters disappears due to a limited number of observations. 
25  All  discipline  dummies  are  relative  to  the  agriculture  and  environment  category.    The 
multidisciplinary category was dropped from the regression (10 researchers). 
26 The faculty of physical education and kinesiology serves as the reference category.   16 
publication  output,  we  report  in  column  (3)  the  results  when  including  previous 
research performance.  We include a dummy which takes the value of 1 when the 
researcher belonged in the previous period to the middle performance category, the 
benchmark  being  the  low  performance  category.    This  coefficient  turns  out  to  be 
highly significant and suggests a large effect:  researchers in the middle performance 
category are about 5 times more likely to reach their first top performance in the next 
period, as compared to researchers in the low performance category, all else equal.  
This result strongly supports the gradual build up of top performance, as was also 
found in the mobility matrices reported in section 4.  An additional check shows that 
this effect holds for both male and female researchers.  Women are less likely to 
jump from the low to the top productivity category, but the difference is not significant.   
 
 
b)  Repeated events results 
 
Table  8 presents the  same  model but this  time to  predict hazard to  all top 
performances  using  a  repeated  events  model.    These  results  are  particularly 
interesting to examine the persistency in top performance.  When comparing these 
results  with  first  top  performance,  we  can  single  out  whether  the  risk  process 
underlying first and subsequent top performance is different
27.   
The results in terms of which characteristics are significant are very similar to 
the results for first top performance, such as the slightly negative impact of teaching 
load  on  the  hazard  to  be  top.    The  gender  effect  remains  important  and  very 
significant.  Also the rank effect remains highly significant with all ranks less likely to 
perform top although the gap with the full professor rank is smaller in the repeated 
events regressions.  Somewhat surprisingly, the head-of-unit result is less strong in 
the  repeated  events  analysis.    The  correction  for  fulltime  position  becomes  even 
more important once we take into account subsequent top performances. 
To further examine the persistence in research performance, we include in the 
repeated events analysis, the number of previous top performances (see Table 8, 
second column).  If top performance is a persistent, accumulative process, we would 
expect this variable to significantly affect the hazard for repeated top performance.  
Indeed the results indicate a significant and substantial higher hazard for next top 
performance, the more previous top performances a researcher has acquired.  Note 
that the other covariates are little affected by the inclusion of the variable.  In the 
second specification we test to which extent there is a gradual accumulation of top 
performance  experience,  by  allowing  the  effects  of  first,  second,  third…top 
performance on the next top performance to differ.  With the exception of the dip in 
the second top performance, the coefficients indicate an upward trend, suggesting 
that the more previous top performances the researcher has acquired the higher the 
hazard for a next top performance, confirming the accumulative nature of the process 
towards  top  performance.    These  findings  are  confirmed  when  estimating  the 
stratified Cox model with separate baseline hazards per event rank, as explained in 
section 5.1.1.  With respect to the appropriate view on the risk process, we compared 
the  estimates  of  the  stratified  Cox  model  using  both  a  gap  time  and  a  counting 
process formulation of time. The counting process formulation fits the data best. This 
implies that the baseline hazard to be top is a function of the total time path since 
                                                 
27  Given that most of the observations in our sample (83%) pertain to first top performance, it will be 
difficult to find strong differences.   17 
entry  as  a  professor,  rather  than  being  determined  by  the  time  since  last  top 
performance only.  
  Table 9 reports the results using a Cox shared frailty
28 model. As discussed 
in  section  5.1.1,  if  there  exists  within-individual  correlation,  the  model  above  is 
misspecified. The frailty model allows checking whether the accumulative advantage 
effect  coming  out  of  the  model  is  robust  when  controlling  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity. The main parameter of interest is the variance of the frailty terms (θ).  
The likelihood ratio test for the second model in the table shows that we can reject 
the hypothesis of no individual heterogeneity.  But when correcting for individual fixed 
effects, all supra reported results remain.  More particularly, the effect of previous top 
performance, although smaller than before (1.17 versus 1.47 as shown in the table), 
remains sizeable and very significant. The third model in the table reveals that men 
and women show a different sensitivity to past top performance with respect to the 
odds of repeating top performance. For a female researcher, each top performance 
almost triples the odds to be top again (2.51). For the male researchers, these odds 
are only half (0.43).  Note that we control for individual heterogeneity so the different 
impact  of  past  top  performance  for  men  and  women  cannot  be  attributed  to  a 
systematic difference in, say, unobserved ability.  The estimates would suggest that 
female scientists are more sensitive to the cumulative advantage effect than men. 
Intuitively, this may be explained as top performance having an even stronger status 
effect if achieved by researchers operating in an underdog position, which arguably 
holds for women in science.  
Finally, when plotting the baseline hazard (see figure 3), visualizing the shape 
of the residual risk over time after controlling for all the observable factors, we see 
that  the  more  time  elapses  since  entry  in  professorship  the  less  likely  it  is  the 
researcher will ever reach top performance. 
 
In sum, the estimated models yield interesting findings with respect to the hazard 
analysis of top performance. In the duration models, the discipline of researchers as 
well as their mode of employment at the university (fulltime versus part time) turned 
out to be very important control variables. Further, and in line with previous research, 
we found a strong gender effect. In contrast, no evidence was found of any age effect 
nor  a  significant  or  sizeable  impact  of  tenure  or  seniority  on  top  productivity.  
Nevertheless,  career  incentives  do  matter:  the  likelihood  to  be  a  top  performing 
researcher increases with rank. In this respect, heading a research lab also has a 
positive  effect  albeit  marginally  significant  in  the  repeated  events  regressions. 
Teaching was found to have a limited but significant substitutive effect on research 
output. We also characterized the path towards top performance as gradual rather 
than  abrupt.  An  important  finding  is  the  significant  and  accumulative  impact  of 
previous top output on the probability to repeat such an accomplishment, especially 
for women.  
 
5.2.  Probability of being Persistent at the Top  
 
In the previous section we used a hazard analysis to look at the process to 
first and subsequent top research performance.  In this section we use as alternative 
                                                 
28 The frailty is shared by all observations pertaining to a single individual and hence captures within-
individual correlation.   18 
approach, a logit analysis of (persistent) top performance to check the robustness of 
our findings. 
The logit analysis examines which characteristics explain the probability to be 
selected  into  a  productivity  cohort,  collapsing  the  time  dimension  towards  top 
performance.  We start in section 5.2.1 by estimating a logit model that explains the 
membership of the 2-yearly productivity clusters.  In section 5.2.2 we focus on the 
selection into the persistent top category.   
 
5.2.1. Explaining selection into the top research category 
 
We  start  with  an  analysis  of  the  probability  to  be  in  the  high  performance 
category relative to being average or low.  The estimated standard errors account for 
the  fact  that  we  have  repeated  observations  for  the  individuals.  The  results  are 
shown in    table 10. The estimates are reported as risk ratios, relative to the middle & 
low output category.    
The results confirm the hazard analysis of section 5.1.4a.   The relative ‘risk’ of 
being in the top category versus an average or low output is significantly higher for 
males than for females.   While age and seniority again have no significant impact, 
higher  ranks  are  significantly  more  likely  to  be  associated  with  high  research 
performance,  as  well  as  being  a  head  of  unit,  again  supporting  the  cumulative 
productivity  effect.      Also  the  corrections  for  discipline,  faculty  membership  and 
fulltime position, as well the negative effect of teaching load are confirmed.   
 
5.2.2. Explaining selection into the persistent top research category 
 
Next  we  use  the  logit  approach  to  analyze  the  probability  of  persistent  top 
performance.  The logit analysis runs into the problem of a very skewed distribution, 
with only a limited number of non zero’s i.e. persistent top performers (N=49), which 
makes it hard  to find a good predictive model.   This  is  why  we also  perform the 
analysis, defining persistency on “good” performance (top and/or average
29), rather 
than “top” performance only.  Furthermore when we focus on the selection into the 
persistence categories, we have to average all the variables over the considered time 
period  per  researcher.      For  the  time-varying  rank  dummy  variable,  we  take  the 
highest rank achieved over  the considered  period,  while  for  the  head of unit  and 
tenured  position,  we  evaluate  whether  the  position  was  ever  achieved  during  the 
considered period.   
 
As  expected,  the  logistic  on  the  highly  skewed  persistent  top  performance 
gives very bad results, with only the rank effect “surviving” as significant effect. The 
tenure effect is significantly negative but only applies to researchers with the most 
junior  rank  as  higher  rank  scientists  are  always  tenured
30.  The  magnitude  of  the 
fulltime dummy is explained by a single part time researcher present in the persistent 
top category.  Turning to the less skewed case of persistent good performance, gives 
more significant results.  These results are in line with the repeated hazard analysis 
of section 5.1.4b.  After correcting for scientific discipline and fulltime position, gender 
and  rank  are  significant  characteristics  in  explaining  persistency  in  good 
                                                 
29 In addition to being more ‘permissive’ towards fallbacks in performance, we also allow for a start-up 
phase: a researcher may initially be part of the low productivity category. Once top performance is achieved she 
may only fall back to the middle productivity category, not the low one. 
30 If tenure is dropped from the model, the effect is completely absorbed by the first rank.   19 
performance, with males and higher ranked academics having a higher probability of 
selection into persistent toppers.   Also the substitute effect of teaching load again 
shows up significantly, while heads of unit come out strongly significantly as having a 
higher probability of selection.   
 
6  Conclusions and Further Research 
 
The paper uses a panel dataset comprising the publications of biomedical and exact 
scientists at the KU Leuven in the period  1992-2001, to (i) study the selection of 
researchers  into  productivity  cohorts:    and  (ii)  analyze  how  they  switch  between 
these  categories  over  time,  contributing  to  the  debate  on  cumulative  advantage 
effects in academic research.  
 
We  find  that  productivity  cohorts  are  generally  persistent  over  time.    The  ‘low’ 
category  is  the  most  ‘trapped’  category  with  a  lower  than  expected  probability  to 
switch to the middle and a fortiori the high productivity cohort in later years. About 
one quarter of the scientists in the sample achieves top performance at least once in 
the observation period, with five out of a hundred scientists being persistently top.  
 
A  hazard  model  predicting  the  time  towards  first  top  performance  confirms  the 
importance  of  gender,  with  females  being  significantly  less  likely  to  reach  top 
performance.  Age and cohort effects are not significant, but rank and hierarchical 
position, as well as previous performance are important for explaining the hazard to 
first top performance, confirming that first top performance is a gradual, accumulative 
process, as the Matthew effect or an innate ability perspective would predict.   
 
When analyzing subsequent top performances, we again find strong support for the 
accumulative process, with the hazard to next top performance being significantly 
and increasingly positively affected by previous top performance.  Rank is important 
not  only  in  predicting  first  top  performance,  but  also  for  persistency  in  top 
performance, supporting even further the accumulative effect.   Also the gender bias 
remains  significant  in  explaining  persistency  in  top  performance,  with  the 
dependence on previous top performance in favor of females.     
 
There  is  some  limited  but  significant  and  consistent  evidence  with  respect  to  the 
substitution  effect  of  teaching  load  on  top  research  performance.    Correction  for 
scientific discipline, full time position and organizational membership is important.  
 
Although  the  current  analysis  provides  interesting  results  with  respect  to  top 
performance  and  its  persistence,  it  also  suggests  exciting  avenues  for  further 
analysis.  A first important extension, suggested by the significance of organizational 
affiliation dummies of the current analysis, is to examine the collective effects in more 
detail, by specifying characteristics of the research teams and networks to which the 
researcher  is  affiliated,  and  with  whom  she  cooperates  in  research  through  co-
publications, within KU Leuven but also beyond.  The significance of the teaching 
effect suggests extending the analysis to properly take into account the substitution - 
or complementarity - among the various output dimensions for researchers:  basic 
research,  teaching  but  also  applied  research  and  own  commercialization  (patents 
and spin-offs).  Also the trade off between quantity and quality of research output can   20 
be  investigated  in  more  detail.    While  the  current  analysis  has  focused  on 
establishing top performance and its persistence in terms of quantity of publications, 
we can extend and compare the analysis taking on board the quality of publications 
dimension,  using  citation  information.    Furthermore,  by  examining  whether 
publications that  yield more  peer  recognition, through  citations, are  more likely to 
establish  persistence  in  performance  we  can  study  the  processes  governing  the 
Matthew effect more carefully.  And this brings us to perhaps the most important 
extension  suggested  by  the  current  analysis,  namely  to  further  characterize  the 
accumulative process of persistent top performance.  Next to promotion, access to 
research lab and team infrastructure, research funding is an important component of 
the accumulative advantage story.  For this we need to extend the database with 
information  on  research  funding  received,  to  examine  whether  it  contributes  to 
establishing and maintaining persistency in research performance.  When including 
funding  and  other  accumulation  components  in  the  performance  analysis,  the 
endogeneity needs to be properly taken into account, by including an instruments or 
systems approach.   
 
Finally, an important limitation of this work is the limited scope of the data since we 
consider the KU Leuven only. Comparison of results with other institutions would be 
very valuable to improve on institutional heterogeneity. 
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7  Tables  
 
 Table 1: Distribution of Researchers over Organizational Units 
 
 
   Table 2: Distribution of Researchers over Disciplines 
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  Table 4: Research Output by Persistence Category (yearly averages) 
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  Table 6: Research output by discipline, active researchers only (N=795)   24 
 
 
   Table 7: Cox models for first top performance 
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Table 8: Cox models for repeated top performance  
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  Table 9: Cox models for repeated top performance with frailty 
   27 
   Table 10: Logit regression results 
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Figure 3: Baseline hazard for repeated top performance   29 
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Appendix 1:   Constructing the database 
 
    The publication and citation data originate from the Science Citation Index (SCI) of 
the  Institute  of  Scientific  Information  (ISI).    As  there  is  no  one-to-one  matching 
between authors and their affiliation address in the ISI data, publications in each of 
the ten yearly publication files were initially retained when at least one author was 
affiliated with the KU Leuven so that a number of non-KU Leuven related authors 
remained present. In a second step, we narrowed the number of publication records 
by means of a merge with the KU Leuven personnel files in order to only retain KU 
Leuven affiliated authors (see infra). 
     
    Since  the  ISI  records  do  not  allow  distinguishing  between  primary-  and  co-
authorship, we used a `full integer' counting scheme for calculating the performance 
data. This means that a publication was counted as "1" for all authors of the paper. 
The same goes for citations: the full number of citations was added to the credits of 
each author of the paper, whereby an author was identified by his or her surname 
plus the first initial. This gives rise to homonyms: within the yearly publication files it 
is  not  possible  to  distinguish  between  authors  that  have  the  same  name.  As 
discussed below, most of these homonyms could be resolved during the merge with 
the university personnel file. 
     
    Because  a  researcher's  last  name  plus  the  first  initial  is  the  only  piece  of 
information  that  is  shared  between  the  ISI  publication  records  and  the  university 
personnel file, the two datasets were combined using this key. In this way, the non-
KU  Leuven  affiliated  researchers  that  were  still  present  in  the  dataset  but  whose 
name did not occur in the personnel files were filtered out. Before carrying out this 
merge operation, 45 homonyms were dropped from the KU Leuven personnel file 
since we could not distinguish between these staff members. However, this does not 
completely rule out mistakes due to homonyms during the merge of the two files. In 
particular,  although  homonyms  were  removed  from  the  personnel  file,  it  is  still 
possible  that  a  homonym  occurs  between  a  KU  Leuven  affiliated  author  and  an 
external  authors  within  the  publications  file.  Because  the  name  occurs  in  the 
personnel file, the publication data of both these author records will be mapped on 
the staff record, biasing upwards the performance of the staff member. Because the 
ISI records do not allow linking authors unambiguously to their affiliation, this problem 
cannot be resolved nor can its magnitude be estimated. We deem it to be a minor 
issue though, and point out that the merge key used inherently mitigates the problem 
since researchers with identically spelled last names but a different initial do not yield 
a 'false positive'. 
 